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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Property-Prescriptive Rights--Extinguishment by Conveyance
of the Servient Estate to a Purchaser Without Notice
In 1934 Fanti constructed a private sewer under property owned
by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company. The railroad neither
consented to nor objected to the construction. In 1963 Welsh pur-
chased the railroad property subject to "all existing ways and
servitudes, howsoever created". Fanti claimed that he had acquired
an easement by prescription and instituted this action to prevent
Welsh from interfering with the use and enjoyment of the sewer. It
was disputed whether or not the railroad company had notice of the
existence of the sewer before the conveyance to Welsh. However,
the trial court, in reversing the commissioner's finding in favor of
Welsh, apparently decided that Fanti acquired the easement and
that a map showing the sewer and a manhole on the railroad
property constituted constructive notice of the sewer. Held, re-
versed. A prescriptive easement cannot be acquired if the owner of
the servient estate has no notice of the easement, and any existing
easement will be extinguished if the servient estate is sold to a pur-
chaser who has neither actual nor constructive notice of the ease-
ment. Fanti v. Welsh, 161 S.E.2d 501 (W. Va. 1968).
There is a split of authority as to who should prevail in situations
similar to the instant case. Some states take the position that a
prescriptive easement will not be extinguished by the subsequent sale
of the servient estate to an innocent purchaser without notice. These
decisions are based on the reasoning that the grantee cannot acquire
greater rights than his grantor had,' or that the registry laws do not
extinguish easements by prescription in favor of bona fide pur-
chasers.' These reasons appear to be nothing more than a restate-
ment of the familiar common law rule of "prior in time, prior in
right".3
The opposite view is illustrated by Fanti4 and the following ex-
McKeon v. Brammer, 238 Iowa 1113, 1125, 29 N.W.2d 518, 525 (1947);
Ricenbaw v. Kraus, 157 Neb. 723, 728, 61 N.W.2d 350, 355 (1953).2 Jones v. Harmon, 175 Cal. App. 2d 869, 878, 1 Cal. Rptr. 192, 198
(Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Shaugtnessey v. Leary, 162 Mass. 108, 112, 38 N.E.
197, 199 (1894); see, 3 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY, § 424 (1952); 3 H.
TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, § 828 (3d ed. 1939 ; Annot., 174 A.L.R. 1241, 1244
(1948).
3 In the case of Proudfoot v. Saffle, 62 W. Va. 51, 57 S.E. 256 (1907),
the court decided that a way of necessity could not be extinguished as long
as the necessity continued to exist; therefore, a subsequent judicial sale of the
servient estate to a purchaser did not extinguish the way of necessity. This
principle was applied in Dewitt v. Elmore, 112 W. Va. 617, 166 S.E. 271
(1932), and a similar result was reached. In neither case, however, did the
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planations have been advanced to substantiate this position. Courts
have been thinking in terms of estoppel; however, since there is no
common law or statutory duty to give notice, there is no fault, and
thus no basis for estoppel.' Another explanation is that the "ap-
parency" requirement, which is necessary in the creation of ease-
ments, has been incorrectly applied to the question of extinguishment
of easements.6 A third approach is that these unrecordable interests
endanger certainty of title and diminish the effectiveness of the
recording system; therefore, courts have yielded to policy reasons
which favor the protection of the innocent purchaser without
notice!
The last explanation seems to give some justification for the court's
decision in Fanti. An opposite result would have placed a burden
on prospective buyers, attorneys, title abstractors or anyone who
relies on the recording system. It should be pointed out, however,
that the court has not eliminated the problem. Instead, the court
has merely shifted the burden to owners of the dominant estates.
These owners are now faced with the problem of continually "ad-
vertising" their rights without any assurance that even this will protect
their interests. Owners of nonapparent easements will now have an
even greater difficulty in making their rights known to prospective
purchasers.
A simple solution would be to expand the recording statutes to
include the recording of titles acquired by adverse possession and
rights acquired by prescription. This solution, of course, would re-
quire additional legislation. Appeals for expanding a state's recording
system are not new. In 1926 it was suggested that an adverse clai-
mant be permitted to file a lis pendens in a suit to quiet title against
the record owner. Since compelling litigation might be undesirable, it
court discuss whether or not the purchaser had notice of the way of necessity.
Why is notice important in dealing with prescriptive easements and yet
seemingly immaterial in dealing with ways of necessity? Since both interests
are unrecordable rights, there is seemingly no logical legal principle to support
such a distinction. It should also be pointed out that the common law is still
in effect in West Virginia except as changed by legislation. W. VA. CONST. art.
VIII, § 21; W. VA. CODE ch. 2, art. 1, § 1 (Michie 1966). Since the recording
statutes, W. VA. CODE ch. 40, art. 1, § 8 (Michie 1966) and W. VA. COD
ch. 40, art. 1, § 9 (Michie 1966), do not include prescriptive rights, the
common law rule of "prior in time, prior in rights" should prevail. Therefore,
if an easement had been acquired by Fanti, it should have survived the
conveyance to Welsh.
4 Accord, Mesmer v. Uharriet, 174 Cal. 110, 162 P. 104 (1916); Back-
hausen v. Mayer, 204 Wisc. 286, 234 N.W. 904 (1931).5 Wiesel v. Smira, 49 R.I. 246, 254, 142 A. 148, 151 (1928).6 McKeon v. Brammer, 238 Iowa 1113, 1124, 29 N.W.2d 518, 523 (1947).
7 Hawley v. McCabe, 117 Conn. 558, 564, 169 A. 192, 194 (1933).
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was further suggested that the adverse claimant be allowed to file
a statement of the adverse claim in the recording office.' If this
statement included sufficient information for indexing, the result
would be a complete recording system which would afford protection
to both purchaser and adverse claimant.
Stephen Lewis Atkinson
8 Ferrier, The Recording Acts and Titles by Adverse Possession and
Prescription, 14 CALIF. L. REv. 287, 296 (1926).
COMPLETE
TRUST SERVICE
TRUST DEPARTMENT
THE FIRST HUNTINGTON
NATIONAL BANK
Fourth Avenue & Tenth Street 0 P.O.Box 179
HUNTINGTON, WEST VIRGINIA 25707
[Vol. 71
A
3
Atkinson: Property--Prescriptive Rights--Extinguishment by Conveyance of th
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1968
